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Governments owe a duty to their constituents to use public 
funds wisely and prudently.  For decades, governments have used 
sealed competitive bidding procedures to award public 
construction projects on the basis of lowest price, which safeguards 
the public from procurement fraud, favoritism, imprudence, and 
extravagance and ensures that public funds are expended in the 
wisest, most efficient, and least objectionable manner.1
In the spring of 2007, the Minnesota Legislature radically 
changed Minnesota’s public-procurement policy by enacting a 
“best value” alternative to the familiar “lowest responsible bidder” 
method of awarding public construction contracts.2  The best value 
model allows public entities to consider factors other than cost 
when awarding contracts.3  In doing so, the best value model injects 
subjectivity into the decision-making process that could result in 
many justifiable challenges to the integrity and validity of best value 
procurements.4  Any Minnesota public body that chooses to use the 
new best value method needs to be aware of the potential for abuse 
that exists within the method.  They should implement sufficient 
safeguards so that the taxpaying public has confidence the method 
does not result in procurement fraud, undue influence, favoritism 
in the selection of contractors, or extravagant and improvident 
procurements. 
This article begins with a history of Minnesota’s public 
procurement law and Minnesota’s traditional use of competitive 
bidding, and it discusses important Minnesota Supreme Court 
decisions and the overarching public policies involved in that 
system.5  The next section reviews the statutory framework 
 
 1. See Coller v. City of Saint Paul, 223 Minn. 376, 387, 26 N.W.2d 835, 841 
(1947). 
 2. See Act of May 25, 2007, H.F. No. 548, ch. 148, art. 3, 2007 Minn. Sess. 
Law. Serv. 1690, 1734–44 (West). 
 3. MINN. STAT. § 16C.02 subdiv. 4a (Supp. 2007). 
 4. See United Techs. Commc’ns Co. v. Wash. County Bd., 624 F. Supp. 185, 
192 (D. Minn. 1985) (stating that “if subjectivity can violate the relevant standard 
of review [then] such a violation is reasonably likely . . . .”). 
 5. See infra Part I.A. 
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governing public procurements as it existed prior to the new best 
value legislation, and it discusses the careful introduction of agency 
discretion in more recent statutes allowing the use of the design-
build and construction management at risk methods of project 
delivery.6  The subsequent section describes the key provisions of 
the new best value legislation, and it presents a table showing how 
the new method applies to public procurements.7  Finally, this 
Article analyzes and critiques the new legislation, and it 
recommends that amendments be made to increase the likelihood 
that the best value procurements will truly yield the best value.8
I. AN OVERVIEW OF COMPETITIVE PROCUREMENT IN MINNESOTA 
A. Case Law and Public Policies 
As early as 1894, the Minnesota Supreme Court addressed the 
need for controls in public contracting.  In Elliot v. City of 
Minneapolis,9 the court expressed concern that there was little to 
govern the award of public contracts other than “the honesty, 
discretion, and good judgment” of the public body.10  The court 
observed that the public would be better served if government 
bodies were required to award contracts to the lowest responsible 
bidder11 and invited state and local legislative bodies to enact such 
requirements.12
Over time, competitive bidding evolved into a strict regime 
with little or no room for government bodies to exercise 
subjectivity or discretion.  As the Minnesota Supreme Court 
observed in Coller v. City of Saint Paul:13
Statutory and city charter provisions requiring competitive 
bidding in the letting of public contracts require, as 
necessary corollaries, that the public officials whose duty it 
 
 6. See infra Part I.B. 
 7. See infra Part II. 
 8. See infra Part III. 
 9. 59 Minn. 111, 60 N.W. 1081 (1894).  Elliot involved the purchase of fuel 
oil by the city for its public works.  Id. at 112, 60 N.W. at 1082. 
 10. Id. at 114, 60 N.W. at 1083. 
 11. “Lowest responsible bidder” is a term of art, defined as “[a] bidder who 
has the lowest price conforming to the contract specifications and who is 
financially able and competent to complete the work, as shown by the bidder’s 
prior performance.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 966 (8th ed. 2004). 
 12. Elliot, 59 Minn. at 115, 60 N.W. at 1083. 
 13. 223 Minn. 376, 26 N.W.2d 835 (1947).  Coller involved a contract for the 
installation of 1070 parking meters.  Id. at 377–78, 26 N.W.2d at 837. 
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is to let a contract should adopt definite plans and 
specifications with respect to the subject matter of the 
contract; that the plans and specifications be so framed as 
to permit free and open bidding by all interested parties; 
that a bid shall constitute a definite offer for the contract 
which can be accepted without further negotiations; and 
that the only function of the public authority with respect 
to bids after they have been received shall be to determine 
who is the lowest responsible bidder.14
This goal, “born of ‘distrust’ of public officers,” was to remove 
as much discretion as possible from the public officials because 
“discretion is precisely where such abuses as fraud, favoritism, 
extravagance, and improvidence in connection with the letting of 
contracts are prevalent.”15
Minnesota courts strictly enforced the competitive bidding 
regime.  To challenge the award of contract, one did not have to 
show actual fraud, or even intent to defraud, but only that the 
prescribed procedures had not been followed, thus raising the 
possibility or opportunity that fraud could have occurred.16  The 
courts never lost sight of the ultimate purpose of competitive 
bidding legislation, which is to give the taxpayers “the best bargain 
for the least money.”17  Courts approved exceptions to the lowest 
responsible bidder method only where necessary to protect the 
taxpayers’ funds.  Accordingly, courts permitted government 
bodies to accept bids with minor, immaterial irregularities, but they 
never permitted consideration or acceptance of bids that were 
materially non-responsive to the terms of bid solicitation.18
 
 14. Id. at 384–85, 26 N.W.2d at 840. 
 15. Id. at 387–88, 26 N.W.2d at 841. 
 16. Griswold v. Ramsey County, 242 Minn. 529, 535–36, 65 N.W.2d 647, 652 
(1954); see also United Techs. Commc’ns Co. v. Wash. County Bd., 624 F. Supp. 
185, 188 (D. Minn. 1985) (“Even the slightest deviations from prescribed form are 
viewed with a most jaundiced eye.” (citing Foley Bros. v. Marshall, 266 Minn. 259, 
123 N.W.2d 387 (1963))). 
 17. Griswold, 242 Minn. at 535, 65 N.W.2d at 652; see also Foley Bros., 266 Minn. 
at 264, 123 N.W.2d at 391 (“The basic purpose of competitive bidding is to give 
the public the benefit of the lowest obtainable price from a responsible 
contractor.”). 
 18. See Carl Bolander & Sons Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 451 N.W.2d 204, 207 
(Minn. 1990) (noting that a bid variance is material if it gives the bidder a 
substantial advantage over the other bidders); Tel. Assocs. v. St. Louis County Bd., 
364 N.W.2d 378, 382 (Minn. 1985) (“A board may waive bid defects if public rights 
are not thereby prejudiced.”); Foley Bros., 266 Minn. at 265, 123 N.W.2d at 391; 
Lovering-Johnson, Inc. v. City of Prior Lake, 588 N.W.2d 499, 502 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1997) (“[T]he issue [is] whether a change or modification to the bid is ‘substantial 
4
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Case law in Minnesota is consistent in its disdain for 
government contract formed on a substantial or material deviation 
from the specifications.19
On all matters involving the substance of a competitive 
bid, such as those that may affect the price, quality or 
quantity, or the manner of performance, or other things 
that go into the actual determination of the amount of 
the bid, there may be no material variation or deviation 
from the specifications.20
Any variance in a bid that gives one bidder a substantial 
advantage or benefit not enjoyed by other bidders is a matter of 
material responsiveness.21  Construction law commentators similarly 
define “bid responsiveness” in this manner: 
Public contracts—federal, state, and local—may only be 
awarded to contractors who submit bids “responsive” to 
the material requirements of the invitation for bids.  
Evaluation of bid responsiveness focuses on compliance of 
the bid with the mandatory requirements of the invitation 
and any governing statutes. . . .  A deviation is “material” if 
it gives the bidder substantial competitive advantage and 
prevents other bidders from competing on an equal 
footing.22
Bids on proposals that are materially non-responsive must be 
rejected to ensure that all competitors are given an equal 
opportunity to win the contract.23  The Federal Court of Claims has 
 
or material.’”).  Variations that affect “price, quality, or quantity, or the manner of 
performance, or other things that go into the actual determination of the amount 
of the bid” are considered material.  Foley Bros., 266 Minn. at 263, 123 N.W.2d at 
390. 
 19. United Techs. Commc’ns, 624 F. Supp. at 191. 
 20. Foley Bros., 266 Minn. at 259, 123 N.W.2d at 390. 
 21. Carl Bolander & Sons Co., 451 N.W.2d at 207. 
 22. 1 PHILIP L. BRUNER & PATRICK J. O’CONNOR, JR., BRUNER & O’CONNOR ON 
CONSTRUCTION LAW § 2:74 (2002 & Supp. 2007). 
 23. Carl Bolander & Sons Co., 451 N.W.2d at 208.  Foley Bros., 266 Minn. at 263, 
123 N.W.2d at 390; Duffy v. Vill. of Princeton, 240 Minn. 9, 12, 60 N.W.2d 27, 29 
(1953); Sutton v. City of St. Paul, 234 Minn. 263, 267, 48 N.W.2d 436, 439 (1951); 
Coller v. City of Saint Paul, 223 Minn. 376, 385, 26 N.W.2d 835, 840 (1947); 
Lovering-Johnson, Inc. v. City of Prior Lake, 558 N.W.2d 499, 502–03  (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1997). Case law from federal courts and state courts across the country 
similarly recognize an absolute obligation to reject non-responsive bids.  See, e.g., 
Toyo Menka Kaisha, Ltd. v. United States, 597 F.2d 1371, 1376 (Ct. Cl. 1979); 
Albert Elia Bldg. Co. v. Sioux City, 418 F. Supp. 176, 179 (N.D. Iowa 1976); Lower 
Kuskokwim Sch. Dist. v. Found. Servs., Inc., 909 P.2d 1383 (Alaska 1996); D.H. 
Williams Constr., Inc. v. Clovis Unified Sch. Dist., 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 345, 350 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2007); Abadie v. D.C. Contract Appeals Bd., 916 A.2d 913, 916 (D.C. 
5
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provided the following salient explanation for the rule that 
materially non-responsive bids must be rejected. 
These principles rest upon and effectuate important 
public policies.  “Rejection of irresponsive bids is 
necessary if the purposes of formal advertising are to be 
attained, that is, to give everyone an equal right to 
compete for Government business, to secure fair prices, 
and to prevent fraud.”  The requirement that a bid be 
responsive is designed to avoid unfairness to other 
contractors who submitted a sealed bid on the 
understanding that they must comply with all of the 
specifications and conditions in the invitation for bids, 
and who could have made a better proposal if they 
imposed conditions upon or variances from the 
contractual terms the government had specified.  The 
rule also avoids placing the contracting officer in the 
difficult position of having to balance the more favorable 
offer of the deviating bidder against the disadvantages to 
the government from the qualifications and conditions 
the bidder has added.  In short, the requirement of 
responsiveness is designed to avoid a method of awarding 
government contracts that would be similar to negotiating 
agreements but which would lack the safeguards present 
in either that system or in true competitive bidding.24
Griswold v. Ramsey County25 is one of the leading Minnesota 
cases on public contracting.  In 1952, Ramsey County appropriated 
$600,000 to build a new county jail.26  After an initial round of bids, 
the county discovered that the construction was going to cost more 
than that amount.27  All the bids were rejected and a new round of 
bidding was initiated.28  In the new solicitation document, the 
bidders were instructed to submit a basic bid and then a list of cost 
reductions for various alternative designs such as elimination of a 
tunnel to the courthouse, not finishing the fourth floor, or use of 
 
2007); Am. Combustion, Inc. v. Minority Bus. Opportunity Comm’n, 441 A.2d 660, 
671 (D.C. 1982); Bigley v. MSD of Wayne Twp. Sch., 823 N.E.2d 278, 284–85 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 2004); Irwin R. Evens & Son, Inc. v. Indianapolis Airport Auth., 584 
N.E.2d 576, 585 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992); Smith & Johnson Constr. Co. v. Ohio Dep’t 
of Transp., 731 N.E.2d 720, 724–25 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998). 
 24. Toyo Menka Kaisha, 597 F.2d at 1377 (citations omitted). 
 25. 242 Minn. 529, 65 N.W.2d 647 (1954).  Griswold has been cited more than 
thirty-five times by subsequent Minnesota appellate courts. 
 26. Id. at 531, 65 N.W.2d at 649. 
 27. Id. at 531, 65 N.W.2d at 649. 
 28. Id. at 531, 65 N.W.2d at 649. 
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cheaper building materials.29  The county reserved the right to 
accept or reject any of the alternatives for six months.30  The intent 
of this novel contracting scheme was to get as much work done as 
possible with the already appropriated money and to defer some 
work items until more funds became available.31  The result, 
however, was to make determination of the lowest responsive 
bidder at the bid opening impossible because different orders of 
bidders were achieved depending on which alternatives were 
deducted from the basic bid.32  The court noted that the process 
theoretically could have resulted in the contract going to the 
higher bidder.33
The Minnesota Supreme Court held that though the 
Legislature has the authority to determine how the state, through 
its agencies and its various political subdivisions, let contracts, it 
remains with the courts to ensure that the legislatively prescribed 
procedures are not used in an unreasonable or arbitrary and 
capricious manner.34  Any contracting procedure that “emasculates 
the safeguards of competitive bidding” is impermissible even if 
fraud does not occur.35  In finding that the county’s procurement 
method violated competitive bidding law, the court reasoned that: 
[a] fundamental purpose of competitive bidding is to 
deprive or limit the discretion of contract making officials 
in the areas which are susceptible to such abuses as fraud, 
favoritism, improvidence, and extravagance.  Any 
competitive bidding procedure which defeats this 
fundamental purpose, even though it be set forth in the 
initial proposal to all bidders, invalidates the construction 
contract although subsequent events establish, as in the 
instant case, that no actual fraud was present.36
For the same reason, the court held that no material change 
can be made to any bid after the bids have been received and 
opened, since to permit such changes would “open the door to 
fraud and collusion.”37  As a logical corollary, “no material change 
 
 29. Id. at 531, 65 N.W.2d at 649. 
 30. Id. at 531, 65 N.W.2d at 649–50. 
 31. Id. at 531, 65 N.W.2d at 650. 
 32. Id. at 531–32, 65 N.W.2d at 650. 
 33. Id. at 537, 65 N.W.2d at 653. 
 34. Id. at 535, 65 N.W.2d at 651–52. 
 35. Id. at 536, 65 N.W.2d at 652. 
 36. Id. at 536, 65 N.W.2d at 652. 
 37. Id. at 536, 65 N.W.2d at 652.  See also Toyo Menka Kaisha, Ltd. v. United 
States, 597 F.2d 1371, 1377 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (“Responsiveness is determined by 
7
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in contract terms may be made after the contract has been let to 
the lowest bidder.”38  In order to prevent even the “opportunity for 
fraud and collusion,” the courts will reject a materially non-
responsive bid even if the item in question may not change the 
determination of the successful bidder.39  These principles and 
rules of responsiveness govern public procurements even if public 
agencies attempt to reserve the right in their solicitation 
documents to waive or overlook them.40  Griswold also observed that 
judicial enforcement requires enough transparency in the public 
contracting process for the tax-paying public to know if they need 
to bring suit to prevent the award of a non-responsive or illegal 
contract.41  Furthermore, the public needs the information to 
determine whether a bid was non-responsive in a timely manner, as 
injunctive relief ceases to be an effective enforcement mechanism 
once construction starts.42  Rather than rely on the “honesty, 
discretion, and good judgment”43 of state officials, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court acknowledged in a later case the public’s role in 
policing letting of contracts by stating that challenges to public 
contracting decisions should be encouraged.44
 
reference to the bids when they are opened and not by reference to subsequent 
changes in a bid.  Allowing a bidder to modify a non-responsive bid when, upon 
opening the bids, it appears that the variations will preclude an award, would 
permit the very kind of bid manipulation and negotiation that the rule is designed 
to prevent.”) (citation omitted). 
 38. Griswold, 242 Minn. at 536, 65 N.W.2d at 652. 
 39. Tel. Assocs., Inc. v. St. Louis County Bd., 364 N.W.2d 378, 382 (Minn. 
1985) (“Public officials, however, have no authority to waive defects which affect or 
destroy competitive bidding. . . .  Although [the item in question] may seem 
minor, in a sharply competitive bidding situation, contract awards are often 
determined by slight differences.  Therefore, a variance in maintenance costs 
might have given one bidder an unfair advantage over the others.”).  See also Carl 
Bolander & Sons Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 451 N.W.2d 204, 208 (Minn. 1990) 
(holding that a failure to submit a bid with Minority-Owned Business Entities 
forms gave one bidder the opportunity to repent its bid and hence obtain a 
competitive advantage resulting in rejection of the bid as non-responsive: “Failure 
to require strict responsiveness, according to bid documents, would impair the 
competitive bidding process.”). 
 40. Griswold, 242 Minn. at 536, 65 N.W.2d at 652; accord Lovering-Johnson, 
Inc. v. City of Prior Lake, 558 N.W.2d 499, 502 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (“The rule 
prohibiting material changes once a bid has been opened applies despite 
provisions in the bid instructions that allow the public entity to waive 
irregularities.”). 
 41. Griswold, 242 Minn. at 537–38, 65 N.W.2d at 653. 
 42. Id. at 538, 65 N.W.2d at 653. 
 43. Elliot v. City of Minneapolis, 59 Minn. 111, 114, 60 N.W. 1081, 1083 
(1894). 
 44. Tel. Assocs., 364 N.W.2d at 383 (“[P]roper challenges to the bid-letting 
8
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In Otter Tail Power Co. v. Village of Elbow Lake,45 the Minnesota 
Supreme Court faced an ancestor of today’s best value 
procurement.  Elbow Lake solicited bids for the various 
components of a new electric power generation and distribution 
system.46  It received six bids for power meters and selected the 
third most expensive option.47  An action to enjoin the 
procurement followed.48  The court held that when an item cannot 
be described by “precise or exact specifications,” the procuring 
body has reasonable discretion in determining the lowest 
responsible bid.49  The court reasoned that “[v]alue is not always 
determined by price alone.”50  The procuring body may consider 
factors such as quality, suitability, and adaptability for the intended 
use, but the court cautioned that the determination must be 
reasonable and based upon “some substantial difference in quality 
or adaptability.”51  The court limited its holding by reiterating that 
in situations where the items to be procured can be specified, the 
public body has no discretion and must accept the lowest bid.52
Regardless of what procurement method is used, the goal is 
clear. 
The very purpose of requiring competitive bidding is to 
divest the officials having the power to let contracts of 
discretion in some respects and to limit its exercise in 
others.  In the area of discretion is precisely where such 
abuses as fraud, favoritism, extravagance, and 
improvidence in connection with the letting of contracts 
are prevalent.  Ordinary legal remedies are inadequate to 
correct resulting wrongs.  The purposes of requirements 
for competitive bidding are to prevent such abuses by 
eliminating opportunities for committing them and to 
promote honesty, economy, and aboveboard dealing in 
the letting of public contracts.53
 
process should be encouraged.”). 
 45. 234 Minn. 419, 49 N.W.2d 197 (1951). 
 46. Id. at 421, 49 N.W.2d at 199. 
 47. Id. at 421–22, 49 N.W.2d at 199–200. 
 48. Id. at 422, 49 N.W.2d at 200. 
 49. Id. at 424, 49 N.W.2d at 201. 
 50. Id. at 425, 49 N.W.2d at 201. 
 51. Id. at 424–25, 49 N.W.2d at 201. 
 52. Id. at 423, 49 N.W.2d at 201. 
 53. Coller v. City of Saint Paul, 223 Minn. 376, 387–88, 26 N.W.2d 835, 841 
(1947). 
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B. Statutory Framework for Public Contracting before the 2007 Best Value 
Legislation 
1. As Generally Applied to Construction Contracts 
Before the 2007 best value legislation, most public 
construction contracts used the lowest responsible bidder 
approach.  Minnesota’s Uniform Municipal Contracting Law 
(UMCL) applied to all political subdivisions of the state, such as 
counties, towns, cities, and school districts.54  For those entities, the 
UMCL required that all contracts exceeding $50,000 be let by 
sealed bidding.55  The statutes giving those public bodies the 
authority to enter into contracts then dictated that the contract 
must be awarded to the lowest responsible bidder.56  For state 
agencies, all building and construction contracts over $50,000 had 
to use a sealed bid method57 and then had to be awarded to the 
lowest responsible bidder.58
2. Best Value in State Procurement other than Construction 
For procurement other than building and construction 
contracts, the Commissioner of Administration was required to use 
procurement methods that were designed to ensure that the state 
received a “best value.”59  When determining best value, 
consideration of price was both mandatory and primary.60  
Consideration of other factors, such as environmental factors, 
quality, and vendor performance, was permitted, but not 
required.61  The solicitation document was required to detail what 
criteria are to be used to evaluate the bids.62  Further, if factors 
other than price were to be considered, the relative weight of the 
 
 54. MINN. STAT. § 471.345 subdiv. 1 (2006). 
 55. Id. at subdiv. 3. 
 56. MINN. STAT. § 375.21 subdiv. 1 (2006) (counties); § 365.37 subdiv. 2 
(towns); § 412.311 (statutory cites); § 123B.52 subdiv. 1 (school districts). 
 57. § 16C.26 subdiv. 3. 
 58. § 16C.28 subdiv. 1. 
 59. § 16C.03 subdiv. 3.  These procurements included goods, services, and 
utilities, all of which were relatively small when compared to building and 
construction contracts.  § 16C.03 subdiv. 3. 
 60. §§ 16C.02 subdiv. 4, 16C.03 subdiv. 3. 
 61. § 16C.02 subdiv. 4. 
 62. § 16C.03 subdiv. 3. 
10
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factors was required to be listed in the solicitation document.63  For 
building and construction contracts, however, the Commissioner of 
Administration was required to use a request for bid process, with 
the contract award going to the lowest responsible bidder.64
3. The Trend Toward More Discretion: MnDOT 
As with other state agencies, statute traditionally required 
Minnesota Department of Transportation (MnDOT) contracts for 
construction on trunk highways to be awarded to the lowest 
responsible bidder.65  In 2001, however, the Legislature granted 
MnDOT the authority, under carefully regulated conditions, to 
circumvent that requirement and to “solicit and award a design-
build contract for a project on the basis of a best value selection 
process.”66  The best value approach may only be used on ten 
percent of the contracts let by MnDOT in any given year,67 and only 
after a finding that using that approach will serve the public 
interest.68  The Commissioner of Transportation has final authority 
on the decision to use a best value acquisition on design-build 
projects69 and must report annually which contracts use that 
method.70
When MnDOT uses the “best value” method on a design-build 
contract, it must follow the so-called “two-step competitive 
process.”71  In the first phase, MnDOT appoints a commission of at 
least five members, one of whom must be a member of the 
 
 63. Id. 
 64. §§ 16C.25–.28.  “Request for bid” is a term of art meaning “a solicitation 
in which the terms, conditions, and specifications are described and responses are 
not subject to negotiation.”  § 16C.02 subdiv. 11.  That method can be contrasted 
with a “request for proposal,” which is “a solicitation in which it is not 
advantageous to set forth all the actual, detailed requirements at the time of 
solicitation and responses are negotiated to achieve best value for the state.”  Id. at 
subdiv. 12. 
 65. MINN. STAT. § 161.32 subdiv. 1b (2000). 
 66. MINN. STAT. § 161.3412 subdiv. 1 (2006).  In a “design-build contract” the 
contractor provides “architectural or engineering and related design services as 
well as labor, material, supplies, equipment, and construction services . . . .”  MINN. 
STAT. § 161.3410 subdiv. 3 (2006).  See also Act of July 1, 2001, ch. 8, art. 3, 2001 
Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 2015 (West). 
 67. MINN. STAT. § 161.3412 subdiv. 3 (2006). 
 68. § 161.3414 subdiv. 1.  When making the determination, MnDOT must 
consider a minimum of ten specific factors, enumerated in section 161.3414 
subdivision 2. 
 69. § 161.3416 subdiv. 2. 
 70. § 161.3428. 
 71. § 161.3412 subdiv. 2. 
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Minnesota Chapter of the Associated General Contractors, to serve 
as a Technical Review Committee.72  Next, MnDOT prepares a 
Request for Qualifications (RFQ), which must include the 
minimum qualifications of the bidders, a statement of work, a 
schedule, project requirements, the form of a contract to be 
awarded, the number of firms to be selected for the short list, the 
weighted criteria for selection, a description of the request for 
proposal requirements, the maximum allowed time for the project, 
MnDOT’s estimated cost of the project, and requirements for 
resources and experience.73  After issuing the RFQ, the “selection 
team” evaluates the responses.74  If fewer than two firms respond, 
MnDOT may either reissue the RFQ or cancel the project.75  If 
enough responses are received, between two and five firms are 
selected to be on the “short list.”76  These firms proceed to the 
second phase of the process.77
In the second phase, MnDOT issues a Request for Proposals 
(RFP) to short-listed builders.78  The RFP must include a statement 
of work, a description of the required qualifications, the weighted 
selection criteria, copies of the contract that the winning proposer 
will be expected to sign, the maximum allowed time for the project, 
and the estimated cost of design and construction.79  The bidders 
must turn in their proposals in two separately sealed packages: a 
technical portion and a price portion.80  The RFP specifies the date, 
time, and location for the public opening of the sealed price 
proposals.81
The Technical Review Committee then reviews the technical 
proposals, rejects any it considers non-responsive,82 and submits 
scores for the responsive proposals.83  At the bid opening, MnDOT 
announces the technical scores and then opens the price 
 
 72. § 161.3420 subdiv. 2. 
 73. Id. at subdiv. 3. 
 74. Id. at subdiv. 4.  Interestingly, this subdivision uses the undefined term 
“selection team” rather than “Technical Review Committee,” even though the 
Technical Review Committee is the administrative body designated to evaluate the 
RFQ responses.  See id. at subdiv. 2. 
 75. Id. at subdiv. 4. 
 76. Id. 
 77. § 161.3422. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. See supra notes 18–21 and accompanying text. 
 83. MINN. STAT. § 161.3426 subdiv. 1(a) (2006). 
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proposals.84  The winning proposal is calculated by dividing each 
bidder’s price by its technical score to yield an adjusted score.85  
MnDOT’s commissioner only has discretion either to reject all the 
proposals or award the contract to the responsive proposal with the 
lowest adjusted score.86
MnDOT was the first public agency to receive design-build 
authority in the 2001 legislative session, and the new legislation was 
a result of industry, agency, and bar collaboration.  Obviously, this 
new type of system allows public officials more discretion and 
judgment in selecting the successful bidder than the traditional 
procurement methods, which required that the award be made to 
the lowest responsible bidder.  All parties involved in drafting this 
legislation, however, were very concerned about maintaining the 
procedural integrity and transparency of the process given the 
inherent subjectivity involved in scoring the proposers’ technical 
proposals.87  Accordingly, the new legislation contains important 
safeguards and unique provisions. 
First, according to the new statute, the assertion of claims on 
previous projects by a proposer cannot be used to evaluate or score 
a bidder’s “past performance” or “experience.”88  This important 
provision protects contractors who assert their legal rights on one 
project from being penalized in the evaluation process on a 
subsequent design-build project. 
Second, the evaluation and award criteria for each phase must 
be clearly identified and then weighted or prioritized in terms of 
importance in the RFQ and RFP.89  The award must then be made 
according to scores obtained from evaluating the proposals 
 
 84. Id. at subdiv. 1(b). 
 85. Id.  If time was listed as a selection criterion in the RFP, MnDOT may 
adjust the scores by assigning a value per day factor.  Id. at subdiv. 1(c).  That 
factor is multiplied by the contractor’s estimated time to completion, yielding a 
dollar amount.  Id.  That amount is added to the price and then divided by the 
technical score.  Id.  The lowest resultant adjusted score must be selected as the 
winner.  Id.  The statutory language is interesting because it is permissive; MnDOT 
is not required to use the time factor, but may if it chooses to do so.  The statute 
does not describe when or by whom that decision must be made.  Likewise, the 
statute does not require that the value per day time factor be included in the RFP, 
nor does it describe how that factor is to be determined.  The statute clearly 
differentiates between the selection time factor and other contractual time factors, 
like the liquidated damages schedule and incentive clauses.  Id. 
 86. Id. at subdiv. 1(d). 
 87. Id. 
 88. § 161.3420 subdiv. 3(10). 
 89. § 161.3422(2). 
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according to the weighted criteria.90  This was intended to prevent 
awards from being justified on vague, after-the-fact statements that 
the successful proposals somehow represented the “best value” to 
the public.  Instead, the awards have to be based on scoring criteria 
that are established and weighted by MnDOT before proposals are 
received.91
Third, the proposers selected to submit an RFP get a stipend 
to help defray the costs of preparing a design for the phase two 
competition, which can be quite expensive.92  This should help 
small bidders compete on more equal footing with larger and 
better capitalized competitors. 
Fourth, the commissioner cannot use design-build 
procurement on more than ten percent of all transportation 
contracts awarded each year.93  In addition, before using design-
build procurement, the commissioner must satisfy several criteria 
intended to gauge whether design-build procurement will best 
serve the public interest on the particular project in question and 
issue a written report justifying use of the method.94  These 
requirements should help ensure that traditional competitive 
bidding for MnDOT projects will not be immediately jettisoned in 
favor of design-build procurement and that design-build 
procurement will only be used on appropriate projects. 
Finally, the statute makes clear that the principle of 
responsiveness is to be enforced in evaluating proposals.  The 
Technical Review Committee reviewing phase two proposals is 
expressly instructed that it “shall reject any proposal it deems non-
responsive.”95  The statute further declares that “[t]he design-
builder selected must be that responsive and responsible design-
builder whose adjusted score is the lowest.”96  In stating how this 
award must be made, the statute imposes the following 
independent duty on the commissioner: “Unless all proposals are 
rejected, the commissioner shall award the contract to the 
responsive and responsible design-builder with the lowest adjusted 
score.”97  Clearly, by the repeated use of the word “responsive,” a 
 
 90. § 161.3426 subdiv. 1(d). 
 91. Id. at subdiv. 1(a). 
 92. Id. at subdiv. 3. 
 93. § 161.3412 subdiv. 3(a). 
 94. Id.; § 161.3414 (2006). 
 95. § 161.3426 subdiv. 1(a). 
 96. Id. at subdiv. 1(b). 
 97. Id. at subdiv. 1(d). 
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well understood term of art, and the mandatory injunction only to 
award to the responsive proposer, the Legislature intended 
MnDOT to enforce the principle of rejecting materially non-
responsive proposals.  Indeed, it is pointless for the statute to 
require MnDOT to clearly state and weight its RFP evaluation 
criteria if, by ignoring the principles of responsiveness, those 
criteria can be disregarded or effectively modified by the Technical 
Review Committee. 
4. The Trend Continues: Department of Administration, University 
of Minnesota, and the Minnesota State Colleges and Universities 
In 2005, the Legislature introduced new procurement options 
for the Minnesota Department of Administration, the University of 
Minnesota (U of M), and the Minnesota State Colleges and 
Universities (MnSCU).98  The administrative department and 
MnSCU were granted authority to use construction manager at risk 
(CM at Risk) and job order contracting.99  All three entities were 
given authority to use design-build contracting.100  Before the 
administrative department or MnSCU can use CM at Risk or 
design-build contracting, however, the administrative department 
commissioner or the Board of Trustees of MnSCU, as appropriate, 
must make a written determination, including specific findings, 
that the desired method serves the public interest.101  This 
requirement is designed to ensure that the new procurement 
methods are not used on projects for which they may not be best 
suited.  To make sure that these new procedures did not 
immediately displace the old, the Legislature also limited the 
number of projects on which CM at Risk and design-build 
contracting can be used.102
 
 98. See generally MINN. STAT. §§ 16C.32–.35 (2006); Act of May 25, 2005, ch. 78, 
2005 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 417 (West). 
 99. § 16C.32 subdiv. 2(a)(2)–(3).  The definition of the term “commissioner” 
in section 16C.32 subdivision 1(6) limits the applicability of the new contracting 
methods to the administrative department and MnSCU.  See also § 16C.34 
(detailing constructing manager at risk); § 16C.35 (detailing job order 
contracting). 
 100. See MINN. STAT. § 16C.32 subdiv. 2(a)(1) (granting authority for design-
build contracting to Minnesota Department of Administration and MnSCU); § 
16C.33 subdiv. 4 (granting design-build contracting authority to U of M). 
 101. § 16C.32 subdiv. 2(e). 
 102. See id. at subdiv. 2(b) (limiting the administrative department and 
MnSCU use of CM at Risk and design-build contracting to no more than five 
percent of its projects in 2006 and 2007 and no more than ten percent thereafter); 
15
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a. Design-Build 
Two types of design-build procurements are authorized.  The 
first is Qualifications Based Selections (QBS).103  As its name 
implies, the QBS method focuses on qualifications.  To start a QBS 
design-build procurement, the agency issues an RFQ that lists the 
weighted criteria and subcriteria that will be used to evaluate the 
proposals.104  At a minimum, the criteria to be evaluated shall 
include the proposer’s experience as a constructor, designer or 
design-builder, its key personnel, its technical competence, its past 
performance on similar projects, its safety record, and its 
availability to and familiarity with project locale.105  The last 
criterion was demanded by out-of-state contractors and designers 
who wanted some evaluation credit for their proximity to a local 
project. 
So that quality concerns do not overwhelm or render 
irrelevant the issue of cost, the solicitation may also ask the 
proposers to state the proposed overhead and fee that the design-
builder proposes to charge for its construction services.106  The 
proposers’ qualifications are then judged by the state Designer 
Selection Board and it creates a short list of at least three, but not 
more than five, proposers.107  After receiving proposals from the 
short-listed proposers, the Board conducts formal interviews of the 
short-listed proposers.108  The administrative department 
commissioner must award the design-build contract to the 
proposer that scores the highest based on the established 
evaluation criteria and subcriteria as determined by the Board, 
unless the commissioner elects to reject all proposals.109  For both 
the U of M and MnSCU, the state Designer Selection Board 
recommends the top two scoring proposers to the U of M Board of 
Regents or the MnSCU Board of Trustees, as appropriate, which 
then makes the final selection.110
 
§ 16C.33 subdiv. 4(d) (imposing similar limits on design-build contracting for U of 
M.). 
 103. § 16C.33 subdiv. 5. 
 104. Id. at subdiv. 5(a)(1). 
 105. Id. at subdiv. 5(a)(2). 
 106. Id. at subdiv. 5(a)(3). 
 107. Id. at subdiv. 5(b). 
 108. Id. at subdiv. 5(c). 
 109. See id. at subdivs. 4(c) (for U of M), 5(d) (for the administrative 
department and MnSCU). 
 110. Id. at subdivs. 4(c), 5(d). 
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The second type of design-build procurement is Design-Price 
Based Selection (DPBS).111  This method also uses a two-step 
process.  First, the agency uses an RFQ process very similar to the 
QBS/RFQ process to narrow the field of potential proposers.112  In 
the second stage, the administrative department, U of M, or 
MnSCU issues an RFP to the short-listed competitors, the state 
Designer Selection Board evaluates the proposals according to the 
criteria and subcriteria defined and weighted in the RFP, and the 
commissioner must award the contract to the highest scoring 
proposer as determined by the Board.113  Because the DPBS method 
primarily evaluates the design and proposed price, the RFP solicits 
preliminary plans and specifications, a critical path method 
schedule, and a guaranteed maximum price for the project.114
b. Construction Management at Risk 
The CM at Risk selection process also consists of two stages.115  
The first involves an RFQ process, the specifics of which are very 
similar to the RFQ for either the QBS or DPBS design-build 
process.116  Because the respective cost for the CM at Risk’s services 
is necessary for a rational comparison of proposals, the 
commissioner may include in the RFQ a request for the proposer’s 
overhead and fee for the CM at Risk’s services.117
The commissioner is required to create a selection committee 
to evaluate the RFQs and RFPs of at least three persons, at least one 
of whom must have construction industry expertise to provide the 
evaluations with some informed foundation.118  The selection 
committee must announce the weighted criteria and subcriteria to 
 
 111. Id. at subdivs. 7–8. 
 112. Id. at subdiv. 7(a). 
 113. Id. at subdivs. 7–8.  As in QBS design-build procurement, the top two 
scoring proposers on U of M and MnSCU procurements are submitted to the U of 
M Board of Regents or the MnSCU Board of Trustees, as appropriate, for final 
selection.  Id. at subdiv. 8(a). 
 114. Id. at subdiv. 7(c). 
 115. § 16C.34.  A “construction manager at risk” is a person or entity selected 
to manage the construction process and be responsible, among other things, for 
the price, schedule, and workmanship of the construction performed.  § 16C.32 
subdiv. 1(7). 
 116. § 16C.34 subdiv. 1; see also supra Part I.B.4.a. 
 117. § 16C.34 subdiv. 1(b).  Just as in the design-build process, the 
“commissioner” means not only the administrative department commissioner but 
also the MnSCU Board of Trustees.  See supra note 99. 
 118. § 16C.34 subdiv. 2(a)(1). 
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be used in scoring the RFQs and RFPs119 and then proceed to select 
a short list of three to five proposers for the more detailed phase 
two RFP process.120  During the second phase, the selection 
committee requests fee and expense proposals, conducts formal 
interviews with each proposer,121 and then recommends to the 
commissioner the CM at Risk proposer achieving the highest score 
according to the weighted criteria stated in the RFP.122  The CM at 
Risk is selected before the project design is complete,123 which 
means that final pricing for the work must be obtained later in the 
process.  In an attempt to ensure competitive pricing after contract 
award, the statute requires that the CM at Risk competitively bid all 
trade work from a list of qualified firms.124  A competitively bid 
process is different than a publicly bid process.  In the latter, all 
responsible contractors may bid, but in the former, the CM at Risk 
and the commissioner are allowed to determine the composition of 
the list of qualified subtrades allowed to bid on the work.125
c. Job Order Contracting 
Job Order Contracting was designed to create an expedited 
method of awarding smaller sized projects.126  MnSCU was 
especially frustrated with the delays involved in traditional public 
bidding and successfully lobbied for a process by which any 
 
 119. Id. at subdiv. 2(a)(2). 
 120. Id. at subdiv. 2(c)(1). 
 121. The post proposal interview process is designed to further 
communications between the proposer and the agency, but it can also foster 
complaints.  If the interviewers are not the same, or if they ask dissimilar 
questions, proposers could feel that the interview process is unevenly conducted 
and that it provides some proposers with competitive advantages over others.  
Hopefully, the agency’s evaluation procedures, adopted pursuant to the statutory 
requirement to conduct these new procurements in “an open, competitive, and 
objective manner,” will guard against these potential problems.  See MINN. STAT. § 
16C.33 subdiv. 5(a)(1) (2006) (QBS); id. at subdiv. 7(a)(2) (DPBS); § 16C.34 
subdiv. 1(c)(2) (CM at Risk).  Fortunately, the statute at least prevents the agency 
from sharing price and other confidential information among the proposers.  
MINN. STAT. § 16C.34 subdiv. 2(c)(3) (2006). 
 122. § 16C.34 subdiv. 2(c)(4). 
 123. One of the purposes of selecting the CM at Risk method of project 
delivery is to allow the CM at Risk to offer preconstruction services such as “value 
engineering” (cost saving) suggestions, constructability reviews, and accurate 
pricing of the plans and specifications as they are being developed.  2 BRUNER & 
O’CONNOR, supra note 22, at §§ 6:22, 6:59. 
 124. § 16C.34 subdiv. 3(e). 
 125. Id. 
 126. § 16C.35. 
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contractor who agreed to sign a standard, master agency contract 
would be pre-qualified to perform the agency’s work.127  Once the 
list of qualified contractors is created, the agency can request bids 
from any (but not necessarily all) contractors on the list without 
advertisement or public bidding.128  For construction contracts up 
to $50,000, the agency must request at least two bids; for contracts 
up to $100,000, the agency must request at least three bids; for 
contracts up to $250,000, the agency must request at least four 
bids.129  The award must be made to the lowest bidder.130  The 
agency head is responsible for developing a system to ensure a 
reasonable opportunity for all qualified contractors to bid on 
construction services on a “periodic” basis.131
d. Risks and Protections 
The design-build, CM at Risk, and job order contracting 
procurement methods invest the administrative department, U of 
M, and MnSCU with increased discretion in determining the 
successful proposer or bidder.  Just like the MnDOT design-build 
statute, however, the final version of Minnesota Statute sections 
16C.32–.35 was a unique collaborative effort that contained 
language agreed upon by all industry and agency stakeholders.132  
As a result of its careful drafting and the respect given to needs and 
interests of all stakeholders, the statute contains many protections 
 
 127. Id. at subdiv. 3. 
 128. Id. at subdiv. 4. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at subdiv 5. 
 131. Id. at subdiv. 6.  It may be difficult to explain to qualified bidders why they 
are unable to bid on job order contracting projects simply because it is not their 
turn to do so.  Similarly, it may be difficult to explain to the public why it is 
advantageous to limit competition to two, three, or four bidders depending on the 
size of the project if other bidders desire to submit bids.  Small, emerging 
contractors often depend on small contracts to get established, and this system 
may make it unduly difficult for them to get an adequate volume of work. 
 132. Indeed, the drafting effort for Minnesota Statutes sections 16C.32–.35 
spanned several years and involved periodic stakeholder drafting sessions 
involving, among others, the administrative board, U of M, MnSCU, the 
Minnesota Chapter of the Associated General Contractors, the Minnesota Chapter 
of the American Institute of Architects, and the Construction Law Society of the 
MSBA.  For a sense of the widespread agreement on the terms of the statute, see 
Hearing on S.F. 1335 Before the Senate State and Local Government Operations Committee, 
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that establish parameters on the discretion given to public agencies 
in this legislation. 
In an effort to insulate the affected agencies or institutions 
from political pressure, undue influence, and accusations of 
favoritism, the statute admirably requires that the independent 
state Designer Selection Board be the entity charged with 
evaluating and scoring the successful design-build proposer.  
Ironically, the Designer Selection Board selects the top candidate 
for the administrative department, but only the top two candidates 
for the U of M and MnSCU, even though the latter two entities are 
more prone to influence through donations to the college.  After 
receiving the top two choices from the Designer Selection Board, 
the U of M and MnSCU are given the discretion to evaluate and 
select the successful proposer.133
To bring more objectivity and transparency to the selection 
process, the agency has to list the selection criteria and subcriteria 
for each stage of the process and the relative evaluation weight that 
each criterion or subcriterion will be given.134  As a result, each 
proposer should be better able to match what they propose to 
supply with what the agency demands, thereby creating an 
economically more efficient procurement.  Furthermore, the award 
must be made to the proposer whose proposal scores the highest 
according to the weighted criteria.  This protection should reduce 
concerns about excessive discretion and after-the-fact justifications 
for awards; it also logically requires that only responsive proposals 
will be received and scored. 
To encourage competition in both the design-build and CM at 
Risk methods and to limit the agencies’ discretion in the selection 
of criteria, the statute requires that any RFQ or RFP “criteria shall 
not impose unnecessary conditions beyond reasonable 
requirements to ensure maximum participation of qualified” 
design-builders or CMs at Risk.135  Both methods further limit the 
acceptable criteria by stating that “[t]he criteria shall not consider 
the collective bargaining status” of the design-builder or CM at 
 
 133. See MINN. STAT. § 16C.33 subdiv. 4(c) (2006) (allowing U of M Board of 
Regents to select from the Board’s top two recommendations); id. at subdivs. 5(d), 
8(a) (allowing the MnSCU Board of Trustees to select from the Board’s top two 
recommendations). 
 134. See, e.g., id. at subdivs. 3(b)(2), 5(a)(1), 5(b), 5(d), 7(a)(2), 8(a); MINN. 
STAT. § 16C.34 subdiv. 1(c)(2) (2006). 
 135. § 16C.33 subdiv. 3(b)(10); § 16C.34 subdiv. 1(c)(9). 
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Risk.136  The requirement to ensure maximum participation is 
especially important, and statutorily required, when QBS design-
builders and CMs at Risk conduct competitive bidding of subtrade 
work.137  Since only those subtrades on a list determined by the 
commissioner and design-builder or CM at Risk are invited to 
submit competitive bids,138 there could be complaints or concerns 
from those subcontractors who feel they are qualified to bid but are 
not invited to participate in the process.  The statute attempts to 
address those concerns by requiring that the list be “based upon an 
open, competitive, and objective prequalification process” and by 
prohibiting unduly restrictive selection criteria.139
To ensure that these new methods are used only in 
appropriate circumstances, the commissioner, for each design-
build or CM at Risk contract, must make a written determination, 
including specific findings, indicating whether use of the design-
build or CM at Risk procurement serves the public interest.140  As 
the MnDOT design-build statute recognized, not every project is 
appropriate for best value design-build or CM at Risk methods,141 
which is why findings justifying their use are essential to determine 
whether it would be preferable to specify the desired best value 
features in the plans and specifications so they can be priced as 
part of a low cost bid procurement to avoid unnecessary and 
potentially harmful subjectivity in the award process.  Other issues 
that the commissioner’s findings should address include, without 
limitation, the extent to which the project requirements for design 
and construction can be adequately defined, the time constraints 
for delivery of the project, the capability and experience of 
potential contractors, the suitability of the project for alternative 
delivery methods in regard to time, cost, schedule and quality 
factors, and the capability and experience of the agency and its 
personnel to adequately manage and oversee the selected delivery 
method.142
 
 136. § 16C.33 subdiv. 3(b)(10); § 16C.34 1(c)(9).  This provision was insisted 
upon by representatives of the Minnesota Chapter of the Associated Builders and 
Contractors, an organization representing non-union or “open shop” contractors, 
as a condition of their support for the legislation. 
 137. § 16C.33 subdiv. 6(b)–(c); § 16C.34 subdivs. 2(a)(2), 3(e). 
 138. See supra note 137. 
 139. Id. 
 140. § 16C.32 subdiv. 2(e). 
 141. § 161.3414. 
 142. Id. at subdiv. 2. 
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In an attempt to further protect the integrity of the process, 
the agency cannot consider a proposer’s past claims history in the 
RFQ and RFP process.143  Thus, design-builders and CMs at Risk 
may assert claims on projects without fear of reprisal or “black-
listing” on future design-build or CM at Risk procurements. 
The amount of time and expense required to generate 
preliminary designs, schedules, and pricing in response to a phase 
two RFP on a DPBS design-build solicitation can be significant, and 
a concern existed that only large regional or national firms would 
be able to afford to compete in this process over time.  To address 
this concern, the amount of design work requested in an RFP 
cannot be exceeded by design-builders, which is intended to 
prevent larger design-builders from outscoring their competition 
by simply spending more money generating many more plan sheets 
than smaller design-builders can afford.144  Therefore, unless 
compensated in excess of the minimum stipend for their effort, the 
statute prohibits proposers from being required to submit detailed 
architectural or engineering design or construction documents as 
part of the proposal.145  To encourage competition, the short-listed 
phase two proposers are also entitled to a stipend to cover the cost 
of generating their design proposals in an amount of not less than 
0.3 percent of the commissioner’s estimated cost of design and 
construction.146  If the RFP requires extensive design services 
beyond preliminary plans and specifications, the stipend is 
required to be adjusted to an amount commensurate with the 
amount of requested design services.147  Design-build experience is 
typically one of the scoring factors, and those who can financially 
afford to continually compete over time would obtain more 
experience and increase their chances of selection.  The stipend 
concept was designed to encourage competition by leveling the 
playing field and paying proposers up front for the services 
required of them. 
 
 143. § 16C.32 subdiv. 1(17). 
 144. § 16C.33 subdiv. 7(f). 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at subdiv. 7(g). 
 147. Id. 
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II. THE 2007 BEST VALUE LEGISLATION 
On May 24, 2007, the Legislature presented the Omnibus State 
Government Finance Bill to the governor.148  Article Three of this 
bill was entitled “Best Value Contracts.”149  Governor Pawlenty 
signed it into law the next day.150
A.  Key Provisions of the Legislation151
The legislation mandates that all building and construction 
contracts let by the Commissioner of Administration follow the 
procedures dictated in Minnesota Statutes section 16C.28, and it 
directs the commissioner to establish procedures for developing 
RFPs and awarding contracts.152  The enabling section requires the 
criteria used for selection to be included in the solicitation 
document, and it requires that the evaluation must be done “in an 
open and competitive manner.”153
The legislation allows “all state building and construction 
contracts” let by the Commissioner of Administration “or an agency 
for which competitive bids or proposals are required” to use either the 
lowest responsible bidder or the best value method.154  The statute 
re-emphasizes that if the best value method is used, the solicitation 
document must include the weighted evaluation criteria, and the 
contract must be awarded to the best scoring proposal.155
The definition of best value was expanded for construction 
contracts.156  Best value procurement must consider price and 
 
 148. H.F. No. 548, 85th Leg. Sess., 2007 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 1690, 1734–44 
(West). 
 149. Id. art. 3, 2007 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. at 1734–44. 
 150. Act of May 25, 2007, H.F. No. 548, ch. 148, 2007 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 
1690 (West).  This hurried passage prevented full and thorough consideration by 
all stakeholders; it was primarily driven by union pressures.  Dean B. Thomson, 
The New Era of Best Value Public Procurement, CONSTRUCTION L. BRIEFING PAPER 
(Fabyanske, Westra, Hart & Thomson, P.A., June 2007), available at 
http://www.fwhtlaw.com/articles/Briefing%20Papers%20in%20html/2007%20Ju
ne.htm. 
 151. All statutory citations in this part refer to the statute as added or amended 
by the Omnibus State Government Finance Act. 
 152. MINN. STAT. § 16C.03 subdiv. 3a (Supp. 2007).  The term “commissioner” 
is defined as “the commissioner of administration.”  § 16C.02 subdiv. 5. 
 153. § 16C.03 subdiv. 3a. 
 154. § 16C.28 subdiv. 1(a) (emphasis added).  The italicized language seems 
to broaden the applicability of this section beyond the department of 
administration. 
 155. Id. at subdiv. 1(c). 
 156. § 16C.02 subdiv. 4(a).  The alternate definition of best value is 
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performance criteria.157  That statute then suggests, but does not 
require, the following non-exclusive performance criteria: 
 
(1) the quality of the vendor’s or contractor’s 
performance on previous projects; 
 
(2) the timeliness of the vendor’s or contractor’s 
performance on previous projects; 
 
(3) the level of customer satisfaction with the vendor’s or 
contractor’s performance on previous projects; 
 
(4) the vendor’s or contractor’s record of performing 
previous projects on budget and ability to minimize 
cost overruns; 
 
(5) the vendor’s or contractor’s ability to minimize 
change orders; 
 
(6) the vendor’s or contractor’s ability to prepare 
appropriate project plans; 
 
(7) the vendor’s or contractor’s technical capacities; 
 
(8) the individual qualifications of the contractor’s key 
personnel; or 
 
(9) the vendor’s or contractor’s ability to assess and 
minimize risks.158 
 
When considering past performance, however, the contracting 
entity cannot consider “the exercise or assertion of a person’s legal 
rights.”159
Recognizing that the implementation of best value contracting 
is a big shift in procurement policy, the Legislature is 
implementing the new method gradually.  For the first three years 
 
distinguishable because it only applies to the acquisition of goods and services.  Id. 
at subdiv. 4. 
 157. Id. at subdiv. 4(a). 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id.  In other words, the contracting entity cannot consider a proposer’s 
claims history. 
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that any organization uses best value contracting, it can only use it 
on up to twenty percent of its projects.160  For the first two years 
following the enactment of the legislation, only state agencies, 
counties, cities, and the largest twenty-five percent of school 
districts may use best value contracting.161  After two years, the 
largest fifty percent of school districts may use it as well.162  Finally, 
three years after enactment, the use of best value contracting is 
unrestricted for all other school districts and political subdivisions 
of the state.163  In a final attempt to improve implementation of the 
legislation, all personnel administering best value contracts or 
writing solicitation documents must be trained in best value 
procedures.164
B. Applicability of Best Value Contracting 
While sections 16C.03 and 16C.28 appear to make best value 
contracting an option for all building and construction contracts in 
the state, over the years, the Legislature has enacted a patchwork of 
provisions empowering Minnesota’s various types of political 
entities and subdivisions to enter into contracts, and it has also 
specified the procedures those entities are to use.  The following 
table shows the applicable statutory provision governing 
contracting for various political entities, indicates whether the 2007 
best value legislation changed that provision, and describes the 













 160. § 16C.28 subdiv. 1a(f). 
 161. Id. at subdiv. 1a(c). 
 162. Id. at subdiv. 1a(d). 
 163. Id. at subdiv. 1a(e). 
 164. § 16C.03 subdiv. 19.  The statute does not specify the length, curriculum, 
or source of the training. 
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Value 
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construction of 
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“most favorable 
to the city or 
county” rather 
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III. ANALYSIS OF THE NEW BEST VALUE LEGISLATION 
It remains to be seen whether the new 2007 best value 
legislation will result in the best and most economically responsible 
procurements of public construction.  The bill was drafted, 
reviewed, and passed in a matter of months, and many stakeholders 
were not able to provide comments or meaningfully participate in 
the development of the legislation.  As a result, the present 
legislation regrettably bears the marks of its hurried passage and 
raises significant questions and concerns that will need to be 
resolved either by good practice, statutory amendment, or court 
decision.  This section of the article analyzes many issues raised by 
the new legislation and suggests how these questions might be 
resolved to ensure that the public truly receives the best value. 
A. Standards of Judicial Review of Best Value Procurements 
The new best value legislation does not alter the traditional 
role of the courts to oversee public procurements through bid 
protests filed by taxpayers or bidders.  At least two standards of 
review will apply to judicial review of best value procurements.  
Both are found in Griswold.165  First, “[i]rrespective of what lawful 
method is adopted or used in the letting of public contracts, it is 
for the courts to determine whether officials in the exercise of their 
discretion have applied the method used in an arbitrary, 
capricious, or unreasonable manner.”166  Thus, a procurement is 
subject to being set aside by the courts if the public body awards a 
contract in violation of this standard. 
The “arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable” standard is not as 
high or as difficult to establish as one might think.  Administrative 
decisions that reflect an error of law, or that are made without 
substantial evidence, for example, would be subject to being 
overturned by the courts.167  And, a decision is arbitrary and 
capricious if the agency relied on unintended factors, entirely 
failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an 
explanation that runs counter to the evidence, or the decision is so 
 
   165.    Griswold v. Ramsey County, 242 Minn. 529, 65 N.W.2d 647 (1954). 
 166. Id. at 535, 65 N.W.2d at 651–52. 
 167. Citizens Advocating Responsible Dev. v. Kandiyohi County Bd. of 
Comm’rs, 713 N.W.2d 817, 832 (Minn. 2006). 
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implausible that it can not be explained as a difference in opinion 
or an exercise of the agency’s expertise.168
Further, the courts’ powers are not limited to reviewing solely 
the issue of whether the award was made in an arbitrary, capricious 
or unreasonable manner.  The courts also have a duty under 
Griswold to make sure that all the procurements, including best 
value competitive bidding, is conducted in a way that safeguards 
the public from fraud, favoritism, improvidence, and 
extravagance169 because safeguarding the public is the intent of any 
statutory procurement method.170  Historically, protestors did not 
commonly invoke the objective “improvidence” or “extravagance” 
standard announced by Griswold to challenge the validity of a 
contract award.  This is likely to change with the advent of best 
value procurement, which could result in contracts being let to the 
highest priced bidder.  Under Griswold, the courts must void any 
contract awarded based on a competitive best value procedure that, 
while purporting to represent the “best value,” would still waste 
public funds to such an egregious extent as to constitute 
“extravagance,” “improvidence,” or even “fraud” on the public.171  
One could foresee challenges of this nature where the solicitation 
for bids does not specify the quantity or quality of the desired 
construction to be provided, and the award is made to the bidder 
who goes overboard supplying far higher quantities or qualities 
than actually needed at far greater cost. 
B. The Requirement of Openness in Best Value Procurement 
The new best value legislation provides that best value 
proposals “must be evaluated in an open and competitive 
manner.”172  The legislation does not provide much guidance on 
how “open” evaluations are to occur, but ordinarily, the public is 
 
 168. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 
43 (1983); Citizens Advocating Responsible Dev., 713 N.W.2d at 832. 
 169. Griswold, 242 Minn. at 535–36, 65 N.W.2d at 652. 
 170. Id. at 535, 65 N.W.2d at 652. 
 171. See id. at 535–36, 65 N.W.2d at 652 (“Generally it is presumed that public 
officials have entered into public contracts in good faith and actual fraud in a 
particular instance must be proved, but this rule has no application in a 
determination of whether the requirements of competitive bidding have been met 
in the letting of a contract and, as a matter of sound public policy, such a contract 
is void, without any showing of actual fraud or an intent to commit fraud, if a 
procedure has been followed which emasculates the safeguards of competitive 
bidding.”). 
 172. MINN. STAT. § 16C.03 subdiv. 3(a) (Supp. 2007). 
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best served by complete transparency.  Again, prior decisions of 
Minnesota’s courts provide guidance on how to interpret the new 
legislation. 
First, there should be little question that the requirement of 
openness was included in the legislation so that procurement 
decisions are completely transparent.  Transparency is necessary in 
public procurements to avoid any appearance of fraud, favoritism, 
or undue influence.  Transparency and openness are also necessary 
to avoid neutralizing “a most important deterrent to fraud and 
improvidence in the letting of public contracts; namely, timely 
preventive action by taxpayers who, in order to act effectively, must 
acquire a knowledge of the true facts before it is too late.”173  The 
courts have long encouraged the policing of public procurement 
by bid protest actions filed either by taxpayers or losing bidders.174  
By including an openness requirement in the new best value 
legislation, the Legislature also has voiced its approval of such 
actions because the deterrent effect of bid protest actions would be 
lessened if the evaluations were not completely open and available 
to public scrutiny. 
To be sure, the new legislation does not in any way modify 
ancient case law recognizing the rights of taxpayers to lodge 
protests against invalid procurements.175  Nor does the new 
 
 173. Griswold, 242 Minn. at 537, 65 N.W.2d at 653. 
 174. Id.  See also Tel. Assocs., Inc. v. St. Louis County Bd., 364 N.W.2d 378, 383 
(Minn. 1985). 
 175. Since at least 1902, the Minnesota Supreme Court has recognized 
taxpayer standing to sue public bodies and protest awards of public contracts.  See 
Schiffman v. City of St. Paul, 88 Minn. 43, 92 N.W. 503 (1902). 
Where a taxpayer has no adequate remedy at law, he has a right in his 
own name to resort to a court of equity to restrain by injunction a 
municipal corporation and its officers from illegally creating debts and 
liabilities which will increase his burdens of taxation; and this upon the 
theory that the damages which he will thus sustain are not in common 
with the damages to other taxpayers, but are special, affecting his private 
rights. 
Id. at 47, 92 N.W. at 504.  See also Arpin v. City of Thief River Falls, 122 Minn. 34, 
37–38, 141 N.W. 833, 834 (1913) (holding that taxpayers have standing to 
challenge a city’s attempt to enter into an illegal contract); Le Tourneau v. Hugo, 
90 Minn. 420, 425–26, 97 N.W. 115, 117–18 (1903) (holding that taxpayers have 
standing to enjoin the execution of a contract for construction of a bridge that was 
let through an impermissible bidding process).  Many leading Minnesota cases on 
public procurement were suits brought by taxpayers challenging improper 
government procurement practices.  See, e.g., Nielsen v. City of Saint Paul, 252 
Minn. 12, 88 N.W.2d 853 (1958); Griswold, 242 Minn. 529, 65 N.W.2d 647; Coller v. 
City of Saint Paul, 223 Minn. 376, 26 N.W.2d 835 (1947); Hendricks v. City of 
Minneapolis, 207 Minn. 151, 290 N.W. 428 (1940). 
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legislation limit the well-settled power or jurisdiction of the courts 
to hear those protests to ensure that the due process rights of 
taxpayers are protected and that the intent of competitive bidding 
statutes is met.176
Nevertheless, in a recent and troubling trend, certain public 
agencies are attempting to screen their decisions from public or 
judicial review by making it practically impossible to protest their 
awards.  For example, MnDOT’s solicitation for the reconstruction 
of the collapsed I-35W bridge attempted to require proposers to 
waive their right to judicial review unless the agency’s decision was 
“wholly arbitrary;” and then, in order to deter any protests, it 
claimed the right to assess all costs and damages (including delays 
and legal fees) of a protest against the proposer if the protest was 
denied.177  The agency also required protests regarding non-
responsiveness to be filed within twenty-four hours, even though it 
would be impossible to determine in one day whether proposals on 
such a complicated procurement were responsive.178  MnDOT 
further refused to disclose its scoring data and the proposals it 
received until it had formally awarded the project, making any 
meaningful review of its actions prior to award impossible.179  
MnDOT then finally awarded the project, but immediately 
executed the contract only moments later, further frustrating any 
possible proposer or taxpayer review of agency action before 
MnDOT committed the state to a $234 million contract that cost 
the taxpayers $85 million more in tax dollars and lost opportunity 
costs than an available alternative proposal.180
The Minnesota Supreme Court expressly reserved to the 
courts the right to review agency action to determine whether a 
procurement decision is illegal, arbitrary, or capricious.181  Public 
bodies or agencies should not be able to limit that judicial review 
or heighten the judicial standard of review from “arbitrary and 
 
 176. See supra notes 40–44 and accompanying text. 
 177. See MNDOT INSTRUCTIONS TO PROPOSERS, ST. ANTHONY FALLS (I-35W) 
BRIDGE DESIGN-BUILD PROJECT add. 7, ¶ 3.10 (Sept. 12, 2007), available at 
http://www.dot.state.mn.us/designbuild/35wbrproject.html. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Jim Foti, Judge Rejects Effort to Stop I-35W Bridge Work, STAR TRIB. 
(Minneapolis), Nov. 1, 2007, at B5; Dave Orrick, Judge Refuses to Halt Bridge Work, 
ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS (Minn.), Nov. 1, 2007, at 6B. 
 181. Griswold v. Ramsey County, 242 Minn. 529, 535, 65 N.W.2d 647, 651–52 
(1954). 
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capricious” to “wholly arbitrary.”182  The Minnesota Supreme Court 
encouraged protests183 and declared them to be the best safeguard 
against fraud and improvidence.184  Therefore, it is against public 
policy to: (1) withhold data from the public and other proposers; 
(2) prevent their ability to protect; (3) create practically impossible 
protest deadlines; and (4) penalize protesting proposers for acting 
as private attorney generals for the benefit of the public.185  Rather 
than force protesters to fight these new types of protest restrictions 
in court on a case-by-case basis, the Legislature should amend the 
2007 best value legislation and the Minnesota Data Practices Act to 
prevent these various attempts by public bodies and agencies to 
shield their decisions from public review and scrutiny.  It should 
ensure that: (1) protests be facilitated, not penalized; (2) the Data 
Practices Act be amended to allow earlier release of scoring data 
and proposals;186 (3) there is an adequate time specified between 
award and contract execution to allow for meaningful review and 
potential protest of agency action; and (4) there is an unrestricted 
right to standard judicial review of agency action. 
Once a public body has decided to award a contract, the “open 
evaluation” requirement in section 16C.03, subdivision 3a, should 
require it to publicly post all of the data and rationales it relied 
upon to make the best value award.  This would give the public and 
other proposers a chance to review the award to make sure it 
complied with the rules and requirements of the solicitation.  With 
the advent of new legislation, it should no longer be necessary for 
taxpayers and proposers to obtain information about a public 
body’s procurement by making a request pursuant to the 
Minnesota Government Data Practices Act;187 all of the information 
to be obtained by such a request should readily and automatically 
be made public by the agency or municipality.  As a result, the 
 
 182. See Hunter v. Zenith Dredge Co., 220 Minn. 318, 326, 19 N.W.2d 795, 799 
(1945) (review of agency decisions must be meaningful to satisfy due process 
concerns); In re Staley, 730 N.W.2d 289, 296 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007) (calling a 
meaningful opportunity to present a case “the hallmark of an individual’s right to 
due process of law”). 
 183. Tel. Assocs., Inc. v. St. Louis County Bd., 364 N.W.2d 378, 382–83 (Minn. 
1985). 
 184. Griswold, 242 Minn. at 537, 65 N.W.2d at 653. 
 185. See Isles Wellness, Inc. v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., 725 N.W.2d 90, 93 
(Minn. 2006) (holding that courts will refuse to enforce contracts that are 
contrary to public policy). 
 186. MINN. STAT. § 13.72 subdiv. 11 (2006). 
 187. § 13.03. 
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taxpaying public will have confidence that public officials are wisely 
protecting the public purse. 
In addition, the new best value legislation provides that if 
interviews are to be a scored criterion, the weight of the interview is 
to be stated in the solicitation for proposals.188  Because proposals 
are to be evaluated in an “open” manner pursuant to section 
16C.03, subdivision 3a, any interviews must also be conducted and 
evaluated in an “open” manner.  Yet, the new legislation is silent on 
how that is to happen.  Face-to-face meetings between bidders and 
the public body might present an opportunity for bidders to curry 
favor or for agents of the public body to demand concessions or 
favors in ways that undermine the integrity of the process.  Thus, if 
bidders are to meet with the public body face-to-face before an 
award, there should be strong checks and balances on such 
meetings to avoid any appearance of fraud or favoritism.189  The 
integrity of the best value bidding procedures would be best served 
if the public body was required to ask the same questions of all 
bidders so that all proposers are offered an equal opportunity to 
compete on a level playing field, and all the answers to the 
questions could be objectively compared and scored on an “apples-
to-apples” basis.  Indeed, it would be very difficult to competitively 
and objectively score an interview if each bidder was asked 
completely different questions.  In addition, a public body would 
be wise to record or videotape the interviews to provide proof that 
the interviews were conducted impartially, openly, and 
competitively. 
C. A Threshold Question: Should the Lowest Responsible Bidder Method 
or the Best Value Method be Used? 
The 2007 best value legislation provides that contracts may be 
awarded to either of the following:  
(1) the lowest responsible bidder . . . ; or (2) the 
vendor or contractor offering the best value, taking 
 
 188. MINN. STAT. § 16C.28 subdiv. 1(c) (Supp. 2007). 
 189. See Griswold, 242 Minn. at 535–36, 65 N.W.2d at 652 (“Generally it is 
presumed that public officials have entered into public contracts in good faith and 
actual fraud in a particular instance must be proved, but this rule has no 
application in a determination of whether the requirements of competitive 
bidding have been met in the letting of a contract and, as a matter of sound public 
policy, such a contract is void, without any showing of actual fraud or an intent to 
commit fraud, if a procedure has been followed which emasculates the safeguards 
of competitive bidding.”). 
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into account the specifications of the request for 
proposals [and] the price and performance criteria as 
set forth in section 16C.02, subdivision 4a, and [as] 
described in the solicitation document.190   
Unfortunately, the legislation offers no guidance on the issue 
of how to decide whether the contract should be awarded by the 
lowest responsible bidder method or the best value method.191  A 
wrong choice of method could be challenged under either of the 
standards of review identified in Part III.A of this article. 
As mentioned in Part I of this article, prior court decisions 
provide sound guidance on the question of whether a public body 
should use lowest responsible bidder or best value procurements.  
In Otter Tail Power Co. v. Village of Elbow Lake,192 for example, the 
court suggested that factors other than cost should be considered 
only where the subject matter of the procurement “is not subject to 
exact specifications.”193  Under this standard, then, the lowest 
responsible bidder method should be used when the subject matter 
of the procurement is capable of exact specification, and best value 
used when the opposite holds true. 
Ordinarily, the subject matter of a construction contract can 
be exactly specified.  Public bodies using lowest responsible bidder 
methods have been doing this for years.  Typically, the public 
owner will contract with an architect or engineer to prepare 
detailed drawings and specifications for the construction project 
which define the quality of work, materials, and other “best” or 
desired values required to be provided by the bidders.  The bidding 
contractors’ responsibility is to build and provide services strictly in 
accordance with what is required in the drawings and specifications 
and thus promise that the owner’s requirements for quality, 
timeliness, and administration will be met.  In such circumstances, 
the owner is receiving exactly the “best values” it specified in the 
drawings and specifications, and the only difference between 
bidders is price.194  Thus, where the subject matter of the contract 
 
 190. MINN. STAT. § 16C.28 subdiv. 1(a) (Supp. 2007). 
 191. See id. at subdiv. 1(b) (stating simply that “[t]he commissioner shall 
determine whether to use” best value or lowest responsible bidder, but not 
indicating how the commissioner should make the determination). 
 192. 234 Minn. 419, 49 N.W.2d 197 (1951). 
 193. Id. at 423, 49 N.W.2d at 201. 
 194. See Dean B. Thomson & Michael J. Kinzer, Best Value in State Construction 
Contracting, CONSTRUCTION LAW., Apr. 1999, at 31, 32 (“[I]f an owner wants the 
better value of a longer life cycle for its equipment, a shorter construction 
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can be precisely specified, the lowest responsible bidder method—
not the best value method—should be used. 
The Legislature has already recognized the danger of a wrong 
choice between the lowest responsible bidder and the best value 
methods.  In the statute that authorizes MnDOT to use the best 
value, MnDOT’s ability to use the method is carefully limited to a 
fraction of MnDOT’s design-build procurements.195  Of course, in 
design-build procurement, the design-builders, and not the public 
owner, provide the architectural and engineering design services 
(drawings and specifications) for the project in addition to the 
labor, supplies, equipment, and materials.  Design-build, then, is a 
type of contract that is not based on fully defined specifications.  
Permitting the best value method in design-build procurements is 
consistent with the reasoning in Otter Tail Power Co., that factors 
other than price might be considered if the subject matter cannot 
be exactly specified. 
It is not sufficient justification to use the best value method 
simply because a component of the procurement might be difficult 
to specify.  For example, the public body might consider “public 
relations” to be an important aspect of the construction contract to 
be procured.196  If best value is to be used, perhaps proposers would 
have an incentive to include far more public relations services than 
the public body needs, so that they could receive a high best value 
score.  The result would be an award to the highest priced proposal 
whose proposed final constructed product was no better than other 
bidders’ final products.  Most likely, the others bidders included 
just enough public relationship services to satisfy the public body’s 
needs.  To avoid such results, a public body could exactly specify 
and expressly require that contractors provide a certain number of 
 
schedule, or higher quality material, then the owner’s design can specify these 
‘value’ requirements in the bid package and the award will go to the lowest priced 
bid.  In this way the public is assured that its tax dollars will be spent to obtain the 
desired or ‘best’ value for the lowest price.”). 
 195. MINN. STAT. § 161.3412 (Supp. 2007).  See supra Part I.B.3 (discussing 
limitations on MnDOT’s ability to use the best value method). 
 196. In MnDOT’s recent design-build solicitation to reconstruct the collapsed 
I-35W bridge, MnDOT allocated fifteen out of 100 points to public relations.  
MNDOT INSTRUCTIONS TO PROPOSERS, supra note 176, at ¶ 4.3.3.6.  The result of 
this best value approach was the award of the design-build project to a proposal 
that cost approximately $57 million more and took seventy days longer to 
construct than an alternative proposal.  See Jim Foti, After the Collapse: Two Bidders 
Feel Misled, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Sept. 21, 2007, at A1 (providing the finalist 
proposers’ time-to-completion, estimated price, and technical and adjusted 
scores). 
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hours of public relations services, provide certain types of services, 
provide a number of advertisements, notices, signs, and the like, 
and use the lowest responsible bidder method. 
A poorly made decision to use the best value method over the 
lowest responsible bidder method presents a significant risk to 
taxpayers that the public body will unnecessarily overspend.  One 
way to lessen this risk is to impose a requirement upon the public 
body to first deliberate and then make a formal, detailed written 
finding that the best value approach will best serve the public 
interest.  As mentioned in Part I.B.3 of this Article, MnDOT is 
required to deliberate on no less than ten factors and make formal 
findings before it can use the best value method for design-build 
contracts.197  The administrative department commissioner and the 
MnSCU Board of Trustees are also required to issue similar 
findings before they can use design-build or CM at Risk best value 
methods.198  If these experienced public agencies and institutions 
are required to deliberate and make findings before they use best 
value procurement, no reason exists why smaller political 
subdivisions, which may not have in-house expertise, should not 
have to do the same.  The 2007 best value statute should be 
amended to require discussion of the appropriate procurement 
method and issue comparable findings before the best value 
method can be used. 
D. Requirement of Responsiveness 
Nothing in the new 2007 best value legislation overrides the 
long-standing rule that a public body must reject proposals that are 
“non-responsive” in some material respect.199  As discussed in Part I 
of this article, a matter is “material” with respect to responsiveness 
if it affects time, price, quality, or manner of performance.200  
Furthermore, a bid or proposal is non-responsive if the variance 
gives the proposer a substantial benefit or advantage not enjoyed by 
 
 197. MINN. STAT. § 161.3414 subdiv. 2 (2006). 
 198. MINN. STAT. § 16C.32 subdiv. 2(e) (2006). 
 199. Carl Bolander & Sons Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 451 N.W.2d 204, 208 
(Minn. 1990); Foley Bros. v. Marshall, 266 Minn. 259, 263, 123 N.W.2d 387, 390 
(1963); Duffy v. Vill. of Princeton, 240 Minn. 9, 12, 60 N.W.2d 27, 29 (1953); 
Sutton v. City of St. Paul, 234 Minn. 263, 267, 48 N.W.2d 436, 439 (1951); Coller v. 
City of Saint Paul, 223 Minn. 376, 385, 26 N.W.2d 835, 840 (1947); Lovering-
Johnson, Inc. v. City of Prior Lake, 558 N.W.2d 499, 502–03 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997). 
 200. Foley Bros., 266 Minn. at 263, 123 N.W.2d at 390; Lovering-Johnson, 558 
N.W.2d at 502. 
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other competitors.201  The rule that non-responsive proposals must 
be rejected ensures that the public receives all of the safeguards of 
the public procurement process because all proposers will have an 
equal opportunity to compete on the same basis.202  When public 
bodies award to proposers who do not compete on the same basis 
as the other proposers (by including additional or excluding 
required matters), a risk exists that the public body did not receive 
the best value because the proposers were not competing on a level 
playing field.  Also, the public is protected from fraud and 
favoritism because the public body is precluded from awarding the 
contract to a competitor on a basis other than what is set forth in 
the solicitation. 
Two provisions in the 2007 best value legislation codify the 
requirement of responsiveness into best value procurements.  First, 
the “criteria to be used to evaluate the proposals must be included 
in the solicitation document and must be evaluated in an open and 
competitive manner.”203  Second, when the best value method is 
used, “the solicitation document must state the relative weight of 
price and other selection criteria,” and the “award must be made to 
the vendor or contractor offering the best value applying the 
weighted selection criteria.”204
These two provisions require a public body to consider only 
the criteria listed in the solicitation, and no other, and only in 
accordance with their weights listed in the solicitation.  The fact 
that the evaluation must also be conducted in an open manner is 
included to make it clear that a public body is prohibited from 
awarding based on secret criteria, criteria developed after-the-fact, 
or preferences that are not listed in the solicitation.  If evaluation 
must also be made in a competitive manner, all proposers are 
entitled to compete on the same basis, which ensures that the 
public benefits from a competitive best value process based on 
materially responsive proposals. 
E. Commentary on Listed Best Value Criteria 
The new best value legislation gives a public body some 
flexibility to identify the particular criteria that will be used to 
 
 201. Lovering-Johnson, 558 N.W.2d at 502–03. 
 202. Griswold v. Ramsey County, 242 Minn. 529, 535, 65 N.W.2d 647, 652 
(1954). 
 203. MINN. STAT. § 16.03 subdiv. 3a (Supp. 2007). 
 204. § 16C.28 subdiv. 1(c). 
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evaluate proposals.  Indeed, it permits the public body to consider 
“the specifications of the request for proposal [and] the price and 
performance criteria as set forth in section 16C.02, subdivision 4a, 
and [as] described in the solicitation document.”205  Although a 
public body has discretion to determine appropriate factors and to 
weight them in the solicitation document, a public body has no 
discretion to consider factors other than the criteria listed in the 
solicitation document or to weight the criteria differently during 
the evaluation process.206  In light of these rules, the public body 
will want to carefully identify and weight the criteria by which 
proposals are to be measured so that the formula actually yields the 
best value for the public.  Poorly selected criteria and weights could 
result in challenges that the procurement process was arbitrary, 
capricious, improvident, or extravagant.207
Because section 16C.02, subdivision 4a, specifically identifies 
nine “performance criteria” that “may” be used, public bodies 
might be inclined to rely heavily upon them to structure the 
solicitation documents.  Regrettably, the nine performance criteria 
identified are vague, redundant, difficult, if not impossible to 
objectively evaluate, and not necessarily tailored to provide the best 
value for the public.  If they are to be used, the nine criteria should 
be clarified to address the concerns discussed below. 
The first listed criterion is “the quality of the vendor’s or 
contractor’s performance on previous projects.”208  It is unclear how 
“quality” is defined or how a public body can objectively assess 
“quality”.  For construction work, quality should be measured by 
the degree to which the contractor’s work complies with the design 
furnished and standards specified by the previous owner.  If the 
owner of a past project wanted the contractor to provide cheap 
materials, and the contractor satisfied the owner’s requirements, 
there should be no tally against the contractor on the quality 
factor. 
Certainly, the public body would need to perform thorough 
data collection and research regarding the previous performance 
of each proposer to obtain a complete and objective picture of the 
quality of the contractor’s previous performance.  Such a task 
might require the contractor to list comparable projects completed 
 
 205. Id. at subdiv. 1(a)(2). 
 206. Id. at subdiv. 1(c). 
 207. See supra Part III.A. 
 208. MINN. STAT. § 16C.02 subdiv. 4a(1) (Supp. 2007). 
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by the contractor and contact information for the owner.  Then, 
the public body would want to conduct recorded interviews of the 
listed owners to see if the contractor’s performance met the public 
body’s quality requirements. 
In addition, the public body might conduct site inspections of 
the contractor’s prior work.  Visual inspections of a contractor’s 
work may not be the best indicator of quality, however, if the 
contractor’s work was in accordance with the contract and observed 
flaws are related to the design or quality specification provided by 
the previous owner, or insufficient maintenance.  While collecting 
the data necessary to properly evaluate quality may be burdensome 
to a public body, a public body risks having an award overturned if 
its analyses of the quality criterion are not based on substantial 
objective evidence.209
The second criterion is “the timeliness of the vendor’s or 
contractor’s performance on previous projects.”210  It is important 
to note that delays are common in the construction industry and 
trying to properly determine fault or responsibility for delays is no 
small or easy task.211  Certainly, a public body should want to have 
its projects completed on time.  Nevertheless, there are ways a 
public body can protect itself from delays other than collecting and 
analyzing substantial data to fairly evaluate the timeliness of a 
contractor’s past performance.  Usually, a public body protects 
itself from delays attributable to the fault of the contractor by 
including in the solicitation documents specified completion dates 
and liquidated-damages provisions assessing damages against the 
contractor for each day the project is late.  Also, if the contract is to 
provide a performance bond, the timeliness of the contractor’s 
performance would be secured by a construction surety. 
The third criterion is “the level of customer satisfaction with 
the vendor’s or contractor’s performance on previous projects.”212  
Satisfaction is often determined by reference to a contractor’s 
quality and timeliness, but if so, then this third criterion is 
redundant of the first two.  Clearly, a better definition of 
“satisfaction” and better objective means to measure it is needed.  
Customer satisfaction is also difficult to measure objectively 
 
 209. See supra Part III.A. 
 210. § 16C.02 subdiv. 4a(2). 
 211. For a sense of how complicated this issue can be, see the 357-page 
discussion of construction delays in 5 BRUNER & O’CONNOR, supra note 22, at ch. 
15. 
 212. § 16C.02 subdiv. 4a(3). 
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because satisfaction is inherently subjective.  Thus, a good 
contractor whose last job was successful could get a bad score if the 
owner of the previous job was prone to complaints, understated in 
his praise, or unreasonably demanding.  It is possible that the 
taxpayers will not receive the benefit of this good contractor’s 
proposal simply because the contractor had the misfortune of 
working in the past for an idiosyncratic customer. 
The fourth criterion permits a public body to measure “the 
vendor’s or contractor’s record of performing previous projects on 
budget and ability to minimize cost overruns.”213  It is hard to 
understand the utility of this criterion.  Most public contracts are 
awarded on a lump-sum basis, which means that the contractor has 
to perform the work for the quoted price.  Thus, any “overruns” 
will be the responsibility of the contractor; in other words, the 
contractor will absorb its overruns and the project will always be 
“on budget” unless the owner requests additional work to increase 
the budget.  Also, the public body’s budget in most circumstances 
is established by the public body’s architect or engineer.  Standard 
agreements between owners and architects refer to budgets 
prepared by the architect as “preliminary estimates” and architects 
attempt to disclaim responsibility for them.214  A contractor whose 
bid exceeds the mistakenly low or preliminary budget of the public 
body, engineer, or architect should not be penalized.  After all, if a 
previous owner did not like the contractor’s bid because it 
exceeded the architect’s preliminary budget, the owner did not 
have to accept the bid.  Instead, the owner could have rejected all 
bids and redesigned and rebid the project. 
In addition, it is common in the construction industry for 
public owners to ask the contractor to perform additional work, 
and the contractor would be contractually entitled to additional 
compensation for that work.  Thus, there will be a “cost overrun,” 
but it will be a cost overrun approved in advance by the public body 
in a change order that modified the contract by the consent of 
both parties.  There should be no penalties assessed against a 
proposer if the cost overrun in question was a change order 
approved and signed by the owner.  Even if the public body does 
not agree to the contractor’s change order request, the public body 
cannot hold an owner-driven cost overrun against a contractor 
 
 213. Id. at subdiv. 4a(4). 
 214. AM. INST. OF ARCHITECTS, AIA DOCUMENT B141 ¶ 2.1.7 (1997), available at 
http://www.designadvisor.org/pdfs/ b141.pdf. 
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because public bodies are not to consider “the exercise or assertion 
of a person’s legal rights”215 in the evaluation process, such as a 
contractor’s request for additional compensation for additional 
work ordered or caused by the owner. 
The fifth criterion, “the vendor’s or contractor’s ability to 
minimize change orders,”216 is also puzzling.  A change order is a 
contractual modification, and as such, must be agreed to by both 
the owner and the contractor.217  No reason exists to penalize a 
contractor who performs extra work at the owner’s request.  The 
only way for a contractor to control such change orders is to refuse 
the requests of the customer for additional work, which is usually 
poor business practice and would result in a low customer 
satisfaction score.  Thus, it is conceivable that a contractor would 
have to trade a future low score on customer satisfaction for a 
future high score on minimization of change orders.  This might 
be a Hobson’s choice depending on whether the contractor’s next 
bid is to a public body who might weight the factors differently 
than anticipated by the contractor. 
Alternatively, the contractor could decide to absorb without 
charge the cost of owner-initiated change order requests so as to 
avoid future low scores regarding change orders.  However, if 
contractors are forced to include contingencies in their prices to 
cover the cost of possible owner changes, the benefits of 
competitive bidding are lost because the system will result in 
artificially inflated pricing.  Certainly, the public does not receive 
the best value from a proposal full of contingencies included to 
cover possible owner requests for future change orders that may 
never occur. 
The sixth criterion is the “vendor’s or contractor’s ability to 
prepare appropriate project plans.”218  This criterion is vague in 
that there is no definition of “project plans.”  If project plans 
means the detailed drawings and specifications for the project, the 
criterion is irrelevant because the 2007 best value legislation does 
not authorize design-build procurement in which the contractor is 
responsible for preparing design drawings.  Instead, the public 
body is responsible for preparing the project plans for the 
 
 215. § 16C.02 subdiv. 4a. 
 216. Id. at subdiv. 4a(5). 
 217. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 247 (8th ed. 2004). 
 218. § 16C.02  subdiv. 4a(6). 
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contractor and the contractor’s job is to build the work according 
to the plans. 
Alternatively, project plans could mean work methods.  Again, 
except in unique circumstances, a contractor’s work methods 
should be largely irrelevant to a public body.  The public body’s 
main concern is receiving the end project that the public body 
specified.  Whether a contractor uses, for example, man-lifts or 
scaffolds to accomplish the work should not be of concern to the 
owner because the end result would be the same.  It is also highly 
doubtful that a public body without in-house expertise would have 
any credible foundation or ability to evaluate a contractor’s 
proposed means and methods for its work. 
It may actually be against the public body’s best interest to 
grade project plans because it may eliminate economic or useful 
innovations.  For example, if by using scaffolds instead of man-lifts, 
contractor A is able to accomplish the work for half the price of 
contractor B, the taxpaying public would be best served by hiring 
contractor A.  However, if contractor B receives a higher score on 
the project plans criterion because the public body prefers man-
lifts, then contractor B might get the contract.  In short, the 
taxpaying public would be paying twice as much for the same work 
simply because the public body, typically comprising lay people, 
thought that man-lifts were a better work plan than scaffolds.  If 
contractors are to be graded on their work plans, they may be 
reluctant to use newer and more efficient methods for fear of being 
scored low on the project plans criterion; and the public will not 
realize the best values from those newer methods. 
The seventh criterion is the “vendor’s or contractor’s technical 
capacities.”219  This criterion seems to overlap the first, third, and 
sixth criteria, each of which indirectly measure the contractor’s 
technical capacities.  Nevertheless, technical capacities could be 
useful for the public body to evaluate—but only on the right 
project.  For example, if contractor A can achieve the required 
work by using low-tech means for a lower price than contractor B 
can achieve the work through high-tech means, the public would 
be better served by going with contractor A.  Going with contractor 
B, simply because it scored higher on the technical capacity 
criterion would be extravagant and improvident.  Rather than 
 
 219. Id. at subdiv. 4a(7). 
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automatically employ this criterion, the public body should be 
required to justify its use in written findings after due deliberation. 
The eighth criterion is “the individual qualifications of the 
contractor’s key personnel.”220  Certainly a public body would want 
to hire contractors with experience in the subject matter of the 
construction contract.  One way of assuring that bidders are 
sufficiently qualified is to use pre-qualification procedures to 
narrow the pool of possible bidders.  Once contractors are pre-
qualified, the public body should be required to issue written 
findings after due deliberation that there is further reason to 
discriminate based on the experience or qualifications of a 
contractor’s “key personnel.” 
The ninth and final suggested criterion is “the vendor’s or 
contractor’s ability to assess and minimize risks.”221  This can also be 
a useful factor for a public body to consider.  Nevertheless, it is 
unclear from the statute exactly what risks contractors are to be 
assessing or minimizing or how this ability is to be demonstrated to 
and objectively measured and scored by a public body.  In addition, 
time, quality, and cost risks are already covered in the first, second, 
third, fourth, and fifth criteria.  The public body can protect itself 
from other risks by requiring the contractor to provide insurance, 
to agree to indemnity provisions, and to provide performance and 
payment bonds. 
Although “the vendor’s or contractor’s price” is not listed 
within the nine specifically listed criteria, the statute requires a 
public body to consider price in best value procurements.222  Even 
though the new legislation defines best value as the result of a 
procurement method that considers specifically “price” and 
“performance criteria,” it fails to mention how much relative weight 
should be given to either consideration.  This gap could lead to 
arbitrary, capricious, or extravagant results.  For example, the 
public body could theoretically assign a one percent weight to price 
and a ninety-nine percent weight to the fifth performance criteria, 
“ability to minimize change orders.”  The contractor with a high 
price, yet a very good score in minimizing change orders, would 
obtain the contract over a contractor with the reverse.  If there are 
 
 220. Id. at subdiv. 4a(8). 
 221. Id. at subdiv. 4a(9). 
 222. See id. at subdiv. 4a (“‘[B]est value’ describes the result determined by a 
procurement method that considers price and performance criteria . . . .”) 
(emphasis added). 
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no owner-driven change orders for the project, the public will have 
paid a premium with no corresponding benefit.  Moreover, with so 
many subjective “best value” points determining which proposer 
will be successful, the price of the proposal can become practically 
irrelevant, which should never create the best value for the public. 
Although the foregoing example is extreme,223 it is designed to 
illustrate that the present legislation should provide more guidance 
with regard to what extent price should be weighted.  Other states 
have specified at least a minimum price weight so that subjective 
best value factors do not overwhelm and render irrelevant the price 
component of the proposals.224
IV. CONCLUSION 
This article recommends that the Legislature immediately 
amend its new 2007 best value legislation.  First, the best value 
method should be permitted only after a public comment period 
and after deliberations and written findings are issued justifying its 
use.  Second, it should be made clear that non-responsive proposals 
are to be rejected to protect the integrity of the competitive process 
and to thwart subjective post hoc evaluation of bids.  Third, the 
concept of “openness” should be further defined to require 
complete transparency in the procurement process.  Fourth, price 
should have a required minimum weight.  Fifth, the “performance 
criteria” should be revised so that they are reasonably tailored to 
lead to a true evaluation of best value.  Sixth, protest rights of 
taxpayers and proposers need to be specifically recognized and 
protected.225
 
 223. This hypothetical perhaps is no so theoretical in light of MnDOT’s 
selection of the most expensive contractor with the longest schedule to rebuild the 
collapsed I-35W bridge at a cost to the public of eighty-five million dollars more 
than an alternative proposal.  See supra notes 179, 195. 
 224. See, e.g., Thomson & Kinzer, supra note 193, at 32 (discussing then current 
South Carolina law requiring price to be given no less than sixty percent weight). 
 225. These legislative suggestions are consistent with the MSBA Construction 
Law Section Principles Re: Procurement Legislation, which the Section created and 
adopted in 2001 and has since repeatedly reaffirmed.  Salient provisions of those 
principles include: 
•      Award criteria must be clearly identified, quantified, and weighted in the 
solicitation, and award must be made pursuant to the stated criteria. 
•      Any procurement method and basis for award must avoid the 
opportunity for favoritism, fraud, collusion, or improvidence. 
•      Allowed procurement methods should maximize competition. 
•      The public should have access to information throughout the 
procurement process. 
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With these changes, the legislation will more likely yield best 
value results.  Nevertheless, public bodies, taxpayers, proposers, 
and courts will also have key roles in ensuring that the new 
legislation will be implemented in a way that guarantees the most 
responsible use of public funds.  In the first instance, the public 
bodies owe a duty to ensure that the taxpayers truly receive the best 
value promised to them in this new legislation.  At a minimum, 
responsible public bodies must: (1) conduct best value 
procurements in a completely transparent manner; (2) carefully 
deliberate on the question of whether it is appropriate to use the 
best value method instead of the lowest responsible bidder method; 
(3) carefully select and weight appropriate criteria to measure 
proposals; (4) ensure that the bids are measured in accordance 
with the selected criteria and their listed weights, not on secret or 
subjective factors; (5) reject bids that are non-responsive; and (6) 
reject all bids if the product of the best value formula yields an 
objectively improvident or extravagant contract. 
Taxpayers and proposers must be active participants in the 
procurement process.  They must: (1) review proposed best value 
criteria to determine if they are justified on their particular project 
and demand that they be revised if they are not; (2) demand at all 
times that proposers be allowed to compete on an equal playing 
field; (3) demand access to the materials and rationales used by 
public bodies to justify awards in best value procurements; and (4) 
lodge complaints if those decisions are made in a fiscally 
irresponsible, arbitrary, or capricious manner. 
Courts also must meet the needs of the taxpayers by making 
sure that the best value legislation is construed in a manner that 
truly gives the taxpaying public the best value.  Courts must ensure 
 
•      In any negotiated procurement, the public agency shall not disclose, 
prior to award, any bidders’ proprietary or confidential information such 
as price or design solutions (no “technical leveling”). 
•      The agency should provide for a specific finding explaining why the 
procurement method selected is preferable for the specific project and 
how that method will maximize the public’s benefit as opposed to other 
methods. 
•      Any responsibility, capability, or qualifications inquiry regarding a bidder 
will not consider that bidder’s past assertions of claimed legal rights. 
•      Award to a successful protestor of its costs, including attorneys’ fees, 
when acting as a private attorney general to uphold bidding laws. 
See Letter from Dean B. Thomson, Chair of the Legislative Subcommittee of the 
MSBA Construction Law Section to Renee Anderson, MSBA Main Office, 
enclosing principles for 2005 (on file with the authors). 
48
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 1 [2007], Art. 9
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol34/iss1/9
2. THOMSON - ADC.DOC 12/15/2007  3:44:28 PM 
2007] BEST VALUE CONTRACTING 73 
that the strict protocols included in the new legislation are followed 
by, among other things, voiding contracts awarded to non-
responsive bidders and guarding against possible fraud, favoritism, 
or undue influence.  Best value procurement requires the constant 
vigilance of all participants to reach its promised potential or else 
the 2007 legislation will not deliver “best value,” but only 
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